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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICA-
TION: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW
JOHN ALLEN WINTERS*
It is difficult to formulate the general principles governing constitu-
tional adjudication. Two preliminary problems are the role of the ob-
server and the nature of the observed. The position taken in this article
is that the observer's role is to understand and to explain from an ex-
ternal point of view. Undoubtedly, there can be a formulation of the
general principles from an internal point of view as Professor H. L. A.
Hart would advocate. To move toward an understanding and not just
a formulation, however, it seems satisfying to be "... content merely
to record the regularities of observable behavior ..." I
To move toward an understanding does not require prediction. We
can even be content to identify interesting variables of the system we
are observing, and with this identification understand and explain with-
out going as far as to predict. It is hoped that these variables, "observ-
able regularities of conduct, predictions, probabilities, and signs," 2 will
give an insight to the general principles of constitutional adjudication.
This approach is an "extreme external point of view" 3 but is justified
if it increases our understanding.
Hart points to the danger of missing a dimension of understanding
by defining the internal aspect of obligatory rules out of existence.4 It
is submitted that Hart does not understand the methodology of the so-
cial sciences and that the study of law is one of the social sciences. Any
observer is an external observer. This has been realized at least since
the dissatisfaction with the introspectionist school of psychology. Hart
is pointing to a small area of behavior, the obligatory nature or rules,
which should also be studied. This study also has to be from an ex-
ternal point of view.
There is a difference between "law" and "the study of law." It
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School; B.A., University of
Minnesota; MA., University of Chicago; LL.B., Cornell University.
1. HART, THE CoNcEPr OF LAW 87 (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 86-88.
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is obvious that a judge while within the system cannot act his role by
defining rules of law as a prediction of what he will do.5 The musical
conductor cannot perform his role by announcing mathematical
formulae which describe the piece of music to be performed. The judge
likewise performs within the system. The lawyer's role in the system
is, in part, to predict for his client, but the lawyer does not predict
in terms of how he is going to predict. Hart does a masterful job in
giving understanding to the nature of this legal system, but his approach
is also necessarily external. He is doing the same thing as the predictive
theorists do, i.e., externally studying the law.
The following discussion externally views the legal system focusing
on the Supreme Court and constitutional adjudication. It will be in a
manner similar to Hart's, pointing to significant variables of the system.
Ideally a mature analysis would approach an attempt at prediction.'
The confusion enters when the predictive theorists call their prediction
"law," but this is the way they are using the word. The thrust of
Hart's criticism is to point out another usage of the word "law"-the
internal obligatory rules themselves. This does not mean that the pre-
dictive theorists or Hart are wrong. The important question is: Which
approach is more useful in the study of the nature of law? Undoubtedly
both add understanding to the study. It is hoped that the approach in
the following discussion also adds an insight.
SOURCES OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Besides the preliminary problem of the role of the observer, there
is the question of the nature of general principles. This might be dis-
cussed in a metaphysical context or in terms of a classification of
5. Hart recognizes this. Id. at 143.
6. For a short discussion of the uses of systematic theory and prediction in the social
sciences see the preface to M. KAPLAN, SYsTEM AND Paocass IN INTERNATIONAL POLITCS at
xi-xviii (1957). The uses of reducing a vast amount of data on the behavior of the
Supreme Court as seen through its decisions to a set of relatively orderly propositions
are that it: 1) permits an explicit statement of variables; 2) permits integration of vari-
ables from other disciplines; 3) helps direct research to all relevant variables; and 4)
is a method for comparing subject matters. When a set of propositions is a theory,
and is logical and empirically grounded, then one should be able to predict modal
behavior within a defined system, i.e., one should be able to predict conditions under
which the system will be stable, the conditions under which it will be transformed, and
the kinds of transformation likely. The discussion here will only assess the variables
and conditions of stability. Even if prediction were attained, prediction per se is not
the ideal object sought; prediction is only an operational test of systematic theoretical
knowledge which is the ideal object.
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norms with principles occupying one category. For operational con-
venience this article uses the sources of a principle as an index of its na-
ture. Along this vein there are several possible approaches. One ap-
proach might be to examine the opinions of the Court and see what
the Justices say their general principles are. This would probably be
the traditional approach of the lawyer. Another approach might be to
evaluate what morally ought to be the general principles. A moral
philosopher might take this approach. An introspectionist might want
to determine what the Justices think their general principles are, apart
from what they say they are. The approach in this article is to try .to
construct a system of interesting variables that satisfy our quest for
understanding. Whether such a system exists "out there" is irrelevant.7
To define a system which systematically fits in with the rest of our
knowledge and which is useful is the nature of all knowledge." These
various approaches can be associated with the various schools of juris-
prudence. The approach of this article is under the sociological school,
looking at law as it functions with the needs of society.10
EXISTENCE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A general principle has no legal reality within the legal system. It
is not a rule which has obligatory force. It is neither a primary or
secondary rule in the language of Hart. It tends to be a secondary rule,
but in no sense is it an authoritative rule for recognition of primary
rules of obligation. It especially approaches being a secondary rule
when the Court refers to it in trying to justify obligatory change in
the static legal system. A general principle is simply an approach, a
postulate, a canon of interpretation, or a guideline. It is a starting point
for legal thinking. The Court refers to these principles in opinions but
they have no independent existence as part of the internal legal system.
When a Justice refers to these principles in explaining decisions, he is
explaining as a social scientist and not performing his legal role.
A general principle is a proposition, a variable, which helps explain
7. For a rejection of "natural systems," see D. EASTON, A FauMEwo.K FOR POLITIC.,L
AxALYSIS 29-30 (1965).
8. All our knowledge is based on artificial constructs, i.e., theories. There is never
certainty, only a theory which temporarily more adequately and simply explains a
phenomenon. See H. MARGENAU, THE NATU=a OF PHYsIcAL. REALIT (1950).
9. For a useful precis of these schools, see 1 R. PoUND, JURIsPRUDENCE 71-90, 291-94
(1959).
10. Cf. McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Orientated Approach to
Legal Study, 1 NATuRAL L.F. 53 (1956).
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change in the system. We need not be confined to the explanations
given by the Justices. We can construct our own system of principles
which have explanatory power. It is submitted that the following
analysis has a superior explanatory power to that of Hart's in relation
to the legal concepts with which the law is concerned within the legal
system and to the concepts of political theory." This is so because of
a clearer recognition of what is meant by internal and external, and
by the addition of general principles to primary and secondary rules.
"The union of primary and secondary rules is at the center of a legal
system; but it is not the whole, and as we move away from the center
we shall have to accomodate . . . elements of a different character." 12
Constitutional adjudication moves away from this legal center. The ele-
ments we shall have to accommodate stem from its political foundations.
A POLITICAL SYSTEM
A general principle as here defined is a variable in the legal system
which we as observers choose for its explanatory power in relation to
the problems in which we are interested. The central problem for this
paper is the reconciliation of the rule of law and the creative role of
the judicial process. A fruitful approach to this problem is to analyze
the variables in terms of systems theory as formulated by Professor
David Easton.13
Can we use a political analysis for the legal system? From Easton's
use of "political," a legal system which makes binding decisions for
society is a political system. Ordinarily it is thought that a legal de-
cision does not involve bending to pressures in the society but is decided
simply on the basis of predetermined and static primary and secondary
rules. On the other hand, a political decision is thought to be one not
based on rules, also authoritative for the society, but based on the
compromising of pressures of ad hoc influence on the decision maker. 14
A politician may foster policies and ideologies to give continuity to
11. HART 95.
12. Id. at 96.
13. See Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, 9 WoR PoLmcs
383 (1957). The reader is urged to consult this article at this point. For greater elabora-
tion, see also D. EAsroN, A F.AMzwoax FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIs (1965); D. EASTON, A
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LnE (1965). To understand the point of departure of
this article one should also refer to M. KAPLAN AND N. KAzNmAcH, PoLITICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961) [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN AND KATZE:NBACH].
14. An excellent short discussion of the distinction of political and legal is in KAPLAN
AND KATZENBACH 1-17.
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his decisions for the purpose of attaining stability in the system. Is, the
Supreme Court likewise making binding decisions for our society to
attain stability in the face of social pressures which could not be at-
tained by simply making legal decisions based on predetermined and
static rules? This is the central point in the current controversy over
the Supreme Court. It is perhaps begging the question to proceed with
a political systems analysis of their decisions, but it is submitted that
this is a useful way to understand the Court from the view of an ex-
ternal observer.
A court changing the common law requirements of commercial law
through a decision undoubtedly makes an authoritative binding de-
cision which allocates scarce resources between plaintiffs and defen-
dants in the future. Legal fictions provide an explanation which would
allow one to say that the law has been constant as a "brooding omni-
presence in the sky," but an external observer might explain the change
in results in disputes between plaintiffs and defendants as being effected
by a political decision.' 5 A new norm is then established providing a
new rule for the legal system. The possibility of a political approach
for analyzing the dynamics of the Supreme Court is impressive. In
many of these legal matters such as commercial law, the Supreme Court
has the final word. As the ultimate authority for interpreting many
aspects of the legal system, it is often in a position to make changes.' 6
15. This would logically follow although against common sense. If legal decisions are
based on rules and there is no rule for the new decision or change from an old rule,
especially if it is a reversal, then it follows that it was not a legal decision. Common
sense would seem to say that there is not always social pressures forcing a political
decision every time there is a slight change from past rules. There need not be pressures,
however, for a political decision. Analytically it can be defined that whenever a judge
departs from the established rules he is making a political decision. But Cf. HART 132:
. . the courts perform a rule producing function . . . "
16. HART 137: ". . . Bishop Hoadly's famous phrase echoed so often by Gray in
The Nature and Sources of Law, 'Nay whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret
any written or spoken laws it is he who is the lawgiver to all intents and purposes
and not the person who first wrote or spoke of them!"' See also HART 138-44. At 141
Hart makes several statements which are compatible with the considerations of stability
in political systems theory: ". . . there is a limit to the extent to which tolerance of
incorrect decisions is compatible with the continued existence of the same game. .. "
However, when applying this dictum to courts Hart simply states that they ". . . are
parts of a system the rules of which are determinate enough at the centre to supply
standards of correct judicial decision. These are regarded by the courts as something
which they are not free to disregard in the exercise of the authority to make those
decisions which cannot be challenged within the system." HART 141-42 (emphasis
added). This explains little. It has the flavor of "instinct." The political systems model,
it is submitted, is superior in explaining the stability of this game.
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More impressive is its position of ultimate guardianship over the con-
stitutional structure of our country. It can scarcely escape from mak-
ing political decisions.17
The role of the Supreme Court is very political. Those who are
quick to criticize the Court fail to consider this peculiar nature of the
litigation before the Court. Because there are many that are quick to
criticize, it is all the more important that the Court keep a fluid posi-
tion in the field of constitutional adjudication. 8 Much of the litigation
before the Court is of extreme importance and the Court's decisions
have far reaching effects beyond the actual litigants. In the United
States, the Supreme Court is much more than a body making judicial
decisions; it is often making political decisions for our society. Based
upon policy considerations in the highest traditions of politics, it lays
down rules allocating values and resources for the society. It is at
the pinnacle of power in our society for determining the norms of
distributive justice. It cannot be expected to make these constitutional
decisions entirely on the basis of the rules of the legal game. The Court
is expounding a constitution for our society. An attempt is made at at-
taining stability by emulating the rule of law, but as a politician has
to be responsive to his electorate, the Supreme Court has to be re-
sponsive to the dynamics of our society. It cannot be responsive by
simply following and distinguishing precedents. Its decisions have to be
political decisions.
It is from this central position in the interpretation of our political
structure that the following analysis of general principles arises. East-
on's scheme presents a framework for the variables.
INPUTS
The system under analysis here is the Supreme Court making bind-
ing political decisions for our society. The basic inputs for this sys-
tem are demands and support. The two interesting demands on the Su-
preme Court are that their opinions be well reasoned in terms of the
legal game, i.e., like cases should be decided alike, and yet the Court
must also meet the demands of justice. There is a demand to be neutral
17. A classic statement of this is Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 1955 CAMB.
LJ. 189: "Hit is always for the courts, in the last resort, to say what is a valid Act
of Parliament; and that the decision of this question is not determined by any rule of law
which can be laid down or altered by any authority outside the courts, it is simply
a political fact."
18. Cf. Hart, Fore'word: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959).
[Vol. 10:315
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and also to be result oriented, to be legal and yet to render equity."
The support given to the Court is an important consideration when
evaluating how far it can go in meeting or denying these conflicting
demands.20 This support can also be analyzed in the terms which Easton
applies to the three-fold structure of the political system, i.e., support
for the political community, regime, and government. Support for the
community is the agreement to settle differences by action in common.
Without this support the very existence of the system would be threat-
ened. Recently there have been suggestions for having procedures to
overrule the Supreme Court. There probably is some withdrawal in
the South of support for the basic system of a Supreme Court as there
is some support to disrupt the whole general political system and en-
gage in another Civil War. These suggestions for change, however,
most likely evidence a withdrawal of support for the regime. Support
for the regime is support for the basic structure. Many Southerners
would replace the Supreme Court with a committee of fifty or some
other structure, but still they support the community. They agree to
be governed by the decisions of some sort of structured Supreme Court.
Support for the government is the support given the actual men oc-
cupying the offices of the regime.
19. When these demands became irreconcilable in England, the system divided into
law and equity.
20.' Of course such a consideration is irrelevant in terms of the legal game. The point
of this study is not to say that the Justices actually make such realistic calculations;
the point is that as an external observer the theory presented here helps explain the
objective behavior of the Court. This is not intended to interpret the subjective thinking
of the Justices.
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Thus, support can be directed toward three objects in the political
system. These are the political community, regime, and government.
It should be noted that there is a spillage effect from one object to the
other, e.g., much support is generated toward the nine Justices as the
government of the system because of their roles in the regime.
OUTPUTS
The basic output of the system is decisions. Vith this output the
system seeks stability. This withinput2 of requiring stability rather
than blindly following the dictates of justice might be repugnant to
some natural law advocates. The use of this withinput for understanding
does seem useful, however, for the external observer." -
21. For an explanation of this concept, see D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF
POLirrcAL LIFE 54-56 (1965).
22. The caveat of note 20 above is relevant here. Cf. KAPLAN AND KATZENBACH 17-19.
Hart says: "We only need the word 'validity', and commonly only use it, to answer
questions which arise within a system." HART 105. See also his discussion on efficacy
and validity. HART 97-107.
Even an absolutist such as Frantz justifies his position in terms of efficacy. Frantz.
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1439 (1962):
It is perfectly conceivable that the public interest-even in "security" or
in national "self preservation"--might be better served by maintaining free-
dom of speech than by the policies and programs to which the first amend-
ment is asked to yield. It may be that freedom of speech is safer than
repression in the long run.
This position is not based only on efficacy but also accounts for justice in a sense. A
form of this conception of law is recommended by McDougal and Lasswell. McDougal,
supra note 10, at 57-58:
The distinction we make between decisions that are taken in accordance
with the expectations and processes of community authority and other de-
cisions may now enable us to clarify and sharpen the conception of law we
recommend. When decisions are taken in the sense that severe deprivations,
or threats of such deprivations, are marshalled to support demands or choices
without regard for authoritative community prescription, such decisions are
not law but naked power or unlawful coercion. When, on the other hand,
effective power is not at the disposal of authority, and expectation of de-
cision in accordance with community prescription lacks realism, such
authority is not law but illusion. The conception of law that we recom-
mend is, accordingly, that of the process of decision in which authority is
conjoined with effective control, in which decisions are both authoritative
and controlling.
An interesting analogy to the problem of absolute idealism and considerations of
-efficacy is the debate between idealism and power politics in international relations.
This "great debate" was started by the publication of H. MoRGEN1Au, IN DEFENSE OF
TE NATIONAL IN-rER.sT (1952). The recent debate in the law journals starting with
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959)
[Vol. 10: 3!5
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Courts are set up in society to allow an alternative to self-help in
disputes when self-help would threaten the stability of the society. The
stress is on minimizing litigation and allowing self-help to solve prob-
lems when possible. The Supreme Court is sometimes compared to a
safety valve for our society-When too much pressure builds up on
important constitutional questions affecting the whole society, the Court
is used to let off some steam and preserve the stability in the society.
In order to maintain itself, the Court has one dominant general
principle that governs constitutional adjudication. The system attempts
to attain stability through the general principle of keeping a fluid posi-
tion: to decide only what they have to decide.
FLUIDITY
The Court does not want to lead itself into blind alleys in following
and distinguishing precedents in the judicial process; it wants to be
creatively ambiguous. For the sake of optimum stability, it is important
that its decisions appear based on the rule of law. Otherwise the Court
will subject itself to severe criticisms and attacks as evidenced by recent
developments. People have an expectancy that decisions will appear to
follow the rule of law to a degree. This appearance is jeopardized when
they often have to reverse and contradict themselves. They cannot
write Judge Handy opinions,2" but have to appear to follow the rule
of law.
There are several sub-principles that govern constitutional adjudi-
cation to help attain a fluid position by allowing the Court to decide
only what it has to.24 These sub-principles effect the appearance of
following the rule of law. The Court can determine for itself, in effect,
parallels this debate. However, there is not an explicit recognition of the political
nature of the legal system and thus the debate is couched in terms of "neutral principles"
and "creativity." The point of view of the present article is that the Court is a powerful
political system which follows its "national interest." However, it follows this interest,
i.e., stability, most efficiently when its stabilizing political decisions can coincide with
the idealism of neutral principles in the legal game. For an analogous conclusion in the
field of international relations see R. OSGOOD, IDEALS AND SELF-INaREST IN AME I cA'S
FoRErGN RELATIONS (1953).
23. This is an allusion to the fictional opinions of Judge Handy in L. FuuLmR, THm
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (temp. ed. 1949). This fictitious judge espoused the
American legal realists' position from the bench.
24. It is emphasized again that technically, in line with the theoretical framework of
this article, these principles only explain and do not allow decisions. The Court itself
may explain its behavior by the following principles but this does not mean that they
are obligatory rules of law.
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when the social pressures make it necessary to decide an issue. This
makes the Court a very powerful organ in our society. Some of these
sub-principles are jurisdictional requirements. The Supreme Court
shares many of these with other courts. For example:
1) Only a final order and not interlocutory orders can be ap-
pealed; 25
2) An issue has to be ripe;26
3) There has to be a case or controversy; 27
4) There has to be standing to sue;28
5) Litigants have to exhaust administrative remedies; a
6) Litigants have to exhaust state remedies before coming to fed-
eral court;30
7) Political questions are not justiciable;31 and
25. The Court has departed from this principle showing that it is not an obligatory
rule. See Mercantile National Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); Local
438, AFL-CIO v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
26. 3 K. DAvis, ADmNisRAT VE LAw TaEAnms (1958): "The basic principle of
ripeness is easy to state: Judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which
are real and present or imminent, not squandered on problems which are abstract or
hypothetical or remote." Davis states that the Court has fluctuated in its application of
this principle.
27. U. S. CONsT. art. I1. The reasons given for this requirement are that an advisory
opinion: 1) would interfere with the Court's independence; 2) would interfere with
the legislative function; and 3) violates separation of powers by combing judicial and
legislative functions. An advisory opinion was held unconstitutional in Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). A prayer for a declaratory judgment, however, has
been held to constitute a controversy. Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288
U.S. 249 (1933).
28. 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 26, at 209: "When a moving party lacks standing to chal-
lenge governmental action before the reviewing court, the usual theory is that the court
lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of the governmental action. But the Supreme
Court applies or ignores the theory as it sees fit in any particular case." See also, id. at
291-92: "[Tlhe federal courts have invented a law of standing that is too complex for the
federal courts to apply consistently." See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
29. The Supreme Court does not invariably enforce this requirement, 3 K. DAvIs,
supra note 26, at 56.
80. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
31. The Court, moreover, will determine what is a political question. Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). This is not a retreat from Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137 (1803), but is an even greater assertion of power, i.e., the Court will decide when
to apply their power. It has now been said that the Court stayed out of the area of
legislative reapportionment too long because of the political question myth. See Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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8) Litigants have to raise any constitutional question at the start
and keep raising it on appeal."2
This principle of keeping a fluid position is not unique to the Supreme
Court. This is an approach of all courts in the legal game, but as the
decisions requested become more important in a political context, the
more important and the more constitutional this approach becomes.
EXPECTANCIES
Besides the jurisdictional sub-principles of the fluidity principle of
stability, there is the demand principle to give the greatest moral force
to a judgment by meeting the expectancies of the society. These ex-
pectancies could vary from society to society. Professor Lon Fuller
lists eight such expectancies in our culture:33
1) The judge should not act on his own initiative, but on the ap-
plication of one or both of the disputants;
2) The judge should have no interest in the outcome;
3) The judge should confine his decision to the controversy and
should not attempt to regulate the parties' relations going be-
yond the controversy;
4) The case should involve an existing controversy and not merely
the prospect of some future disagreement;
5) The judge should decide the case solely on the basis of the evi-
dence and arguments presented to him by the parties;34
6) Each disputant should be given ample opportunity to present
his case;
7) The judge should give reasons for his decision; 35 and
8) The judge should proceed according to previously declared
rules.
Others could be added, e.g., the judge should be concerned with the
real nature of the transaction and not the disguise. These principles are
not peculiar to constitutional adjudication.
32. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). One has to even anticipate the un-
constitutional construction of a statute by a state court while an appeal is pending.
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 794 (1935).
33. L. FULLER, supra note 23, at 706-08.
34. Civil law countries do not follow this procedure. Sometimes the Supreme Court
has been known to decide on the basis of issues not presented by the parties. Sometimes
the Court decides in a certain way no matter what is argued.
35. Fuller makes the point that this will lessen the moral force of a decision if it is
apparent that the judge did not understand the case. L. FULLER, supra note 23, at 708.
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General Principle One: .Neutrality
Decide like cases alike according to previously announced
rules.
General Principle Two: Procedural Due Process





Decisions confined to controversy
Existing controversy
Decision on basis of evidence presented
Ample opportunity to present case
Judge should give reasons
General Principle Three: Equity
Decide with some result orientation in spite of harsh previ-
ously announced rules.
PECULIAR CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE: CREATIVITY
We are looking for principles that explain the Court's behavior in
constitutional adjudication. The central question is the purpose of the
principle. It is tautological simply to answer that the principle is to
'explain the outcome of disputes. Fuller's principles are undoubtedly ap-
plicable to constitutional adjudication as well as to the commercial law
case where no change is effected and no political decision is made even
in the broad sense used here. His principles are not peculiar to consti-
tutional adjudication.
What principles are peculiar to constitutional adjudication?- The
answer lies in the peculi r nature of constitutional adjudication. The
importance of a constitutional dispute .far transcends the litigants in-
volved. Its resolution molds the structure of our society. The principles
[Vol. 1.0:315
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governing constitutional adjudication should not just maximize the
moral support of the particular litigants but should strive to mold so-
ciety in the best possible way for all. Expressions espousing this cre-%
ative role are common.36 Such expressions typify the sociological ap-
proach to law. Law is a device to attain the needs of society. These
needs of society will be a demand on the system. Whatever these par-
ticular needs may be, however, the over-all general principle is to ob-
tain support from society to attain stability. This is done in part through
political decisions which meet these needs.
The current controversy over the Supreme Court stems from the
fact that this creativity is thought to be in the hands of the legislature
and not in the hands of the courts. The courts are to continue playing
their legal game rigidly and if injustice creeps in, the Court can bring
it to the attention of the legislature whose role it is to make such changes.
Is there any meaning to this debate in the literature about "neutral
principles" and judicial creativity? 37 The debate really boils down to a
misunderstanding between the opponents. Both sides admit that the
Court should give legal reasons for its decisions and not write Judge
Handy opinions. But there seems to be confusion about their creative
role. Professor Wechsler says that the Court can be creative but at'
the same time it must be principled.38 Much of the controversy is simply
over whether a particular decision is principled or not." But there is a
36. For example, see Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutr'alization in Contitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. Cmi. L. REv. 661, 684, 689, 690 (1960).
37. Cf. Henson, A Criticism of Criticism: In re Meaning, 22 FORDHAM L. REv. 553
(1961). He concludes that the Court makes more semantical sense than its critics. "Too
much of the recent criticism of the Supreme Court is of this semantically empty va-
riety. It is of no value to anyone ...What does it 'mean' to, say that the Supreme
Court's decisions are sometimes more 'result orientated' than is ideal? What is 'ideal'?
How could a judge possibly decide a case without considering the result of his de-
cision?" Id. at 559. A possible answer to the last question is that a judge could decide
a case without considering the result if it involved a choice-of-law problem. The
judge would first determine which law should apply and after making this decision
without "peeking" at the result under the alternatives, he would apply this law to the
case. This neutral objectivity could exist in other areas of litigation if a judge could
avoid the temptation of looking ahead at the results of the determination of a rule after
application.
38. See letter by Wechsler contained in Pollack, Constitutional Adjudication: Relative
or Absolute Neutrality, 11 J. PuB. L. 48 (1962)..
39. See Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 637, 652-62 (1959); Pollack, Racial Discrhnination and Judicial Integrity,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). Both Henkin and Pollack agree with Wechsler's thesis,
but only proceed to attempt to show that the particular cases Wechsler gives as examples
of the Court being unprincipled are actually examples of principled decisions.
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real conflict which is not well articulated in the literature. The Court
as a political system is confronted with the input of meeting the con-
flicting expectancies of remaining within static rules and with meeting
the constantly changing expectancies of justice within the society. This
is a conflict between logic and value. The critics of Wechsler take up
the battle cry of Holmes and Pound against mechanical jurisprudence.
"The life of the law has not been logic."
To me, Professor Wechsler's lecture . . . represents a repudia-
tion of all we have learned about law since Holmes published his
Common Law in 1881, and Roscoe Pound followed during the first
decade of this century with his pathbreaking pleas for a result-
orientated, sociological jurisprudence, rather than a mechanical
one. It would raise the element of rules, of precedent, of what he
calls "principles" or "reasons" in the judicial process to a position
of absolute primacy which all we know about law denies. 40
CREATIVITY AND THE WRITTEN OPINION
We may know this about the law, but does this mean that the judge
who is actually playing the legal game should write a Judge Handy
opinion? The reason this is such a rhetorical question is because of our
strong expectancies that the judge will play the legal game in terms of
neutral principles. Because of this expectancy, the system to survive
follows this principle within the tolerances of the system. These
tolerances may be wider in the field of constitutional adjudication by
the Supreme Court because there is an expectancy that the Supreme
Court will make political decisions. There is recognition that it is a
political system. To this degree of recognition, the Court can safely
play the legal game with political overtones.
Except when the pressures are so strong for a result which cannot
be rationalized in legal language, the Court should decide on the basis
of legalities in order to optimize the feedback effect of the outputs of
ideology and policy. The judge cannot explain his role while he is
within the system. Professor Wechsler must likewise feel that he is
within the system while he is a professor of law and will not talk
about creativity apart from following the norms of the legal game.
Many of his critics do not understand this position and fall head over
40. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 123, 138 (1962).
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heels discussing questions of value and criticizing Wechsler for being
an immoral neutralist.41
No one doubts that judges should be moral and should decide on
the basis of values besides legal doctrine.
... [C] onfrontation of values is what constitutional adjudication
is all about... [This] does not mean an impass.... It does mean
that judges must identify the competing values, must estimate the
value consequences of preferring one set of competing values to
another and must choose.42
Does this mean that these value debates should be reflected in the opin-
ion as a basis for decision? 4 Cardozo stated:
:. . [S]ymmetrical development may be bought at too high a
price. Uniformity ceases to be good when it becomes uni-
formity of oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or
certainty must then be balanced against the social interest served
by equity and fairness....
If you ask how he is to know when one interest outweighs the
other, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the
legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief,
from life itself.
44
41. For example, see Miller and Howell, supra note 36. Much of their article is of
interest, but it seems to misunderstand Wechsler's notion of neutral principles. Their
point is that one cannot be objective in the social science. But, as discussed above, the
judge's role within the system is not that of a social scientist. He is playing a role
in a legal game with obligatory rules. He has the internal point of view, as discussed
by Hart. Thus, most of Wechsler's critics are talking on a different level. Their dis-
cussion of value has little significance on Wechsler's level. They are talking about
different things. The critics of Wechsler would not want an abandonment of the rule
of law and allow Judge Handy to run wild. However, Miller and Howell do seem to
understand the problem in a strange dictum with a strange hint: "Legal fictions
permeate law and the legal process. They are useful to the extent that they serve
desirable ends. The 'shining . . .ideal of the rule of law above men, evolved solely
from Reason' is partially fictional in nature. It is a useful fiction. But the alternative
is not despotism." id. at 695. Is not the alternative Judge Handy and is this not
despotism?
42. Pollack, supra note 38.
43. Cf. the criticism by Professor Currie in the conflict of law field that it is not
for a court to balance the interests of the fora. Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudica-
tion versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958). See also
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing
Test, 76 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963).
44.B. CARDozo, TmE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRCSS 112-14 (1921).
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Is this balancing- to be in the opinion?45 In brief, these balanced de-
cisions are political decisions. "In short, the judge is inevitable [sic]
concerned with policy, since law is 'a means to social ends, and not an
end in itself.' He makes law, and does not merely find it." 46 But within
the legal game should the fiction of finding the law be dispensed with
and the judge admit that he is a maker of law? We as external observers
can recognize that he makes the law; this is useful for our understand-
ing. The judge, however, has a different perspective.
The legal realists who criticize Wechsler are looking for more pre-
dictability and certainty in their own minds by discarding the myth
of legal formalism. To advocate that the judge also discard this myth
while playing his role is quite another matter. For the purpose of more
predictability, such a change in the role of a judge would create more
uncertainty:47
LLEWELLYN VS. CREArIVITY
A most satisfactory analysis of the creative role of the judge is that
45. If it does reach the status of being accounted for in the opinion, will it not take
on the character of legal doctrine to be followed and then again discarded because of
future social interests? Do these critics in the footsteps of Holmes envision the lawyer
arguing before a court on the basis of policy? Can appeal be made to natural law?
Because of the sheer volume of litigation, policy arguments would soon take on the
symbolic character of legal rules. This is a channeling device of any political system.
46. Rostow, supra note 40, at 131.
47. See Clark and Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedonz
in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L. J. 255, 267 (1961). An interesting comparison
is in the field of conflict of law. The shift from the formalistic Beale rules to approaches
which weigh the interests of the jurisdictions involved has been attacked by the Bealists
as importing unpredictability into the area because of the largely subjective nature of
the judges weighing of interests. Currie's criticism is that it is not his role to make
such a judgment in the first place. In any case, after the initial decisions of weight to
be given in various situations have been rendered, then these will evolve into legal
formalism and will give more predictability than the formalism of Beale because of
the greater sophistication of analysis of issues through the weighing of interests. But
think of.the .disruption of certainty in ordering litigation if a judge were suddenly to
declare 'he: was going to decide cases henceforth on the basis of justice on the facts
rather -than through the use of neutral legal formalism.
It should be noted that at least two writers advocate realistic frankness on the part
of the judge for reasons other than greater predictability. Professor Horack in his
article Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 388
(1950) pressed the courts to admit their role in interpretating statutes to impress on
them such a responsibility instead of their traditional passing the buck by strictly con-
struing statutes. And Jerome Frank ingeniously argued for the same approach to
statutes but for the reason that this will encourage them to exercise such acknowledged
power within responsible limits. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. Rtv. 1271 (1947).
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of KalLlewellyn in The Commonz Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals.
In seventy percent of appellate cases the decision is predetermined by
the legal rules of the system. In thirty percent of the cases, however,
ithere is a novelty which allows the judge a degree of creativity. This
does not allow him to be arbitrary; there are steadying factors.48 These
'factors place restraints on the political decisions of the Court. Under
',the analysis above and using Llewellyn's thirty percent statistic, we
'can say that the Court makes political decisions in about thirty percent
of the cases, i.e., when they are not forced to decide a certain way
by the established norms.49 Although these partially overlap with Full-
er's principles listed above, these steadying factors are more meaning-
fully listed as withinput demands for stability rather than under the
public expectancy for justice. These steadying factors are thus sub-
principles in our model under the principle of having a substantial per-
centage (seventy percent) of forced decisions.
The courts are able to be creative within the legal doctrine because
of a "Grand Style."
One factor which convinces Professor Llewellyn that the law
grows along discernible lines is his discovery that in a major por-
tion of decided cases appellate courts base their holding on an un-
qualified citation to prior authority ... but that in 30 per cent
of the cases studied the citation was to a prior ruling that was not
in strict terms a holding. From this he concludes that the courts
are building, are creating, but that they are able to do this within
bounds set by available doctrine ... it is the return to the Grand
Style which, for Llewellyn, is the real key to reckonability of our
courts today... This judicial style viewed precedents "as wel-
come and very persuasive," but tested precedent against three
types of reason: (1) the reputation of the opinion-writing judge,
(2) "principle"-a broad generalization yielding sense and order
-and (3) "policy" or the consequences of the rule .... it is the
48. K. LLEWLL-YN, THE COMMON LAW TRADroN: DECIDING APPEALS 19-61 (1960).
These steadying factors are listed in summary form, id. at 19, to wit: (1) Law-condi-
tioned Officials; (2) Legal Doctrine; (3) Known Doctrinal Techniques; (4) Responsibili-
ty for Justice; (5) The Tradition of One Single Right Answer; (6) An Opinion of the
Court; (7) A Frozen Record from Below; (8) Issues Limited, Sharpened, Phrased; (9)
Adversary Argument by Counsel; (10) Group Decision; (11) Judicial Security and
Honesty; (12) A Known Bench; (13) The General Period-Style and Its Promise; and
(14) Professional Judicial Office.
49. Political decisions are also made when the Court departs from the established
norms.
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General Principle One: Fluidity
Decide only what is necessary to decide through imposing
jurisdictional requirements.







Raise constitutional question at start
General Principle Two: Mechanical Jurisprudence
Decide as forced to seventy percent of time by applying the
established norms; in remaining thirty percent, steadying fac-
tors prevent arbitrary decisions.
50. Clark and Trubek, supra note 47, at 259-60.
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This analysis of Llewellyn's statement is similar to Hart's statement
that the law has an open texture. "The open texture of law means that
there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be left to be
developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of cir-
cumstances between competing interests which vary in weight from
case to case." 51 His statement is strikingly similar to the analysis here
except he does not call this creative role political. He also adds that
the courts "disclaim any such creative function." The analysis here
points out why this disclaimer is made. It is not one of the moves in
the legal game. To move so would work against the stability of the
system. This analysis also imports an element of rule scepticism which
Hart argues against. The political rule is not just limited to the thirty
percent or to the open texture. The Supreme Court can choose to go
against the seventy percent of solidified rules. This is also done by
"striking a balance, in the light of circumstances between competing
interests." In terms of systems theory this is explained by the stability
requirements and the variables analyzed above.
CONCLUSION
This analysis leaves the legal system little different from the political
system. The existence of the rules for which Hart is arguing so hard
can be explained by systems theory as simply the building up of
ideology and policy. These are anticipatory outputs of the system by
which support is maintained. Ideology is the belief that decisions will







The Tradition of One Single Right Answer
An Opinion of the Court
A Frozen Record from Below
Issues Limited, Sharpened, Phrased
Adversary Argument by Counsel
Group Decision
Judicial Security and Honesty
A Known Bench
The General Period-Style and Its Promise
Professional Judicial Office
WILLIAM AND M.ARY LAW REVIEW
be within a certain range. Ideologies introduce stability by giving
people a probability of what will happen in future policy decisions.
Policies are the interpretative statements about binding decisions. The
rules of the legal system fit into this analysis.
There is one significant difference between the legal system and the
traditional political system. This is the variable of input and output of
resources. Of course, there is some input of resources but the legal
system does not have control of the resources in its jurisdiction in the
way that a territorial sovereign has. The legal system cannot determine
its budget. Its utilization of power in no sense comes close to the pos-
sibility of getting support through the manipulation of the allocation of
resources which is open to a legislature. A legal system, as here analyzed,
cannot make decisions on the allocation of resources in the absence of
a legal dispute before it. Also, support is not built up for the system
through informal benefits obtained from judges, i.e., patronage power,
in the way it is done by the ordinary politicians. Because of the ab-
sence of these ways to build up support for the system, rules take on
a very important role in the stability of the system.
Even, with these differences we are justified in analyzing the legal
system as a political system if it suits the purposes of one's research.
Systems theory as outlined by Easton need not be limited to political
systems. Any system could be analyzed in terms of this input-output
framework.52 We here called the legal system political because then
Easton's terminology used for the political system could be applied and
it seemed highly illuminating. That a system strives for stability is not
itself political. This is not the political foundation of the legal system.
The political foundation as here analyzed is that the legal system is a
political system, i.e., it makes binding decisions allocating scarce re-
sources for the society. Its decisions are not always based on past rules
and to this extent these are political decisions.
Where 'is the traditional political system in this analysis? It is outside
the legal system as a parameter. It is an independent variable the changes
of which we might be interested .in as to its influence on the legal sys-
tem, e.g., a change in federalism or the separation of powers. We have
not gone into these interrelations as might have been expected from
the title.53
52. Cf. the unpublished discussions at the joint meetings of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools and the Law and Society Association in Detroit, December 27, 1967, on
the subject "Systems Approaches to Socio-Economic Problems."
53. KAPLAN AND KATzEDaACU, supra note 13, goes into the influence of the changes
in the political structure of Europe on the specific rules, of international law. I have not
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From this analysis, something similar to Hart's work has arisen,
although in another way. Morality has been removed from the legal
system. It is a game with no goals of substantive rules which are sup-
pose to emerge. Validity of a rule in Hart's system is a question of
fact even from an internal point of view.5 4 In this article, it is also a
question of fact. The only considerations are stability, efficacy, and the
factual determination of expectancies.
It is hoped that there is some semantical meaning in this article and that
it is not the semantically empty variety warned against by Henson.55 The
model in this article is not intended to replace Hart's model or anyone
else's. The judge can give a decision as to what the law is, but in this
study about law it is not the conclusion that is important. Roy Stone
expressed it well when he said:
What I have attempted to show is that to obtain a concept of
law it is not enough to replace this or that model, the command
theory of Austin or the predictive theory of the American Realist
by another theory, say that of the "obligation" and the "to be ob-
liged" of Professor Hart as a paradigm, to the features of which
any system of laws must approximate to be a candidate for ad-
mission: that what is important is the argument in support and
against such a candidature. These arguments may be that ratiocina-
discussed any specific rules of constitutional law in light of political influences. I have
set down principles of constitutional adjudication in the framework of systems theory
and explained the function of these general principles as variables within the legal
system itself without going into the parameters of the system. A variable is a param-
eter outside the system when it can be accepted as a given without going into detail
as to how the variable operates. Inside the system is only that which is of direct impact
on the system; and these are the variables with which I have been concerned here,
examining them directly going into detail as to their nature as well as their change.
Of course the selection of variables is an arbitrary matter depending on one's purposes.
Here we have left out the traditional political system from direct analysis, and have
not considered how its changes affect the legal system. Undoubtedly the traditional
legal system is a political system also. Thus, we have two political systems paralleling
each other within the same society. Or better said, the legal apparatus of society has
political features which make it a sub-political system of the general political system.
Cf. Fenno, The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem
of Integration, 56 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 310 (1962). Each of the three branches of gov-
ernment is a sub-political system making binding decisions. Perhaps all that is being
said here is the old statement that the government is composed of three branches. But
it is often overlooked because of the mythology about rules that the judicial branch
is also political. The attempt here has been to show this through a systematic analysis
of the general principles of constitutional adjudication in terms of systems theory.
54. HART 107.
55. Henson, supra note 37.
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tion found in courts of law, the informal logic which is a nice mix-
ture of the rhetoric and dialectic, the argument from the case to
case which sometimes resembles moves in chess, the counting by a
child on an abacus, the doing of a sum or an exercise in logic, the
holding of a prism to the light to see the rainbow and the transla-
tion of a Latin prose, or the composition of a Greek verse: and at
the end of it all we know what every schoolboy knows, it matters
not whether you win or lose but "how you play the game." 56
56. Stone, Symposium and Suit, Northwestern Rev, Winter 1961, at 24.
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